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The globalization of trade in food has brought great economic benets. Imports have expanded consumer
choices and helped maintain a competitive domestic food market. Greater competition, in turn, has resulted
in higher eciency and lower-cost food products. Food exports have generated jobs and contributed to
the health of the American economy. While conferring tangible economic benets on the American public,
the expansion of international commerce also has posed considerable challenges for the U.S. food safety
regulatory structure. In light of the expansion of global trade, the U.S. regulatory system has been faced
with the dual challenge of protecting public health by maintaining high national food quality and safety
standards, while at the same time meeting U.S. obligations under international trade treaties.1
The U.S. food safety system{comprised of several regulatory agencies promulgating and enforcing food qual-
ity and safety standards{is one of the strongest in the world. Stringent food safety regulations have a twofold
advantage: they ensure high public health protection in the domestic market, and make U.S. food exports
appealing to consumers abroad. Given the advantages of high food safety standards, it is essential to main-
tain them despite any downward pressures by the international commerce.2
This paper analyzes the implications of the new global trade architecture|with its outright prohibition
of the use of food safety standards as disguised barriers to trade and its prominent emphasis on interna-
tional regulatory harmonization|for the international and U.S. food safety regulation. How, if at all, will
the international trade regulatory framework|comprised of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
1Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America's Safety System for the Twenty {First Century|Who is Responsible for What
When it Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges of the Consumer-Driven Global Economy, 52 Food & Drug L.J.13,
*26 (1997).
2Id.
1Codex Alimentarius Commission|aect U.S food safety standards? How should the U.S. regulatory struc-
ture respond to globalization of trade in food? Should it lower its food safety standards in response to
international competitive trade pressures or instead raise the global regulatory bar by exercising its global
leadership? What impact will global regulatory harmonization have on national food safety regulations? Is
it likely to bring national food safety requirements to a consistently high level of consumer protection{or
drive them downward, thereby imperiling consumer wellbeing? What limits do cultural variables impose
on global eorts at regulatory harmonization? How should governments, in promoting free trade, strike the
right balance between the pursuit of economic benets and protection of consumer health?
In analyzing the likely impact of the global trade regime on food safety, this study proceeds in the following
way. Part I examines the Codex Alimentarius Commission's newly elevated status as the WTO designated
key reference authority in trade disputes. Part II considers the Beef Hormone dispute between the European
Union (EU) and the United States, as the rst instance of the WTO invocation of Codex standards as a ref-
erence in evaluating national food safety measures. Part III examines Codex's structure and standard-setting
process. Part IV compares Codex's and FDA' food safety standards and makes policy recommendations with
regard to the FDA's review of Codex standards. Part V investigates the role of culture in food regulation
and its impact on harmonization. Finally, Part VI oers concluding remarks about the implications of the
new global trade regime for food safety and suggests possible governmental responses.
I. Newly Elevated Status of Codex Alimentarius Commission
Recognizing the desirability of harmonization of international food regulations to ease the ow of food prod-
ucts across borders, the Unites States, along with 164 other states, is a member of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission{a subsidiary of the United Nations' World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agri-
2culture Organization (FAO){created in 1962 with the purpose of developing and promoting an international
set of food safety standards to protect consumer heath and ensure fair trade practices.3
Since 1962, Codex has promulgated numerous standards, guidelines, codes of practice, and recommendations,
including food commodity standards, and regular subject food standards. In the course of its standard-setting
tenure, Codex has assessed the safety of over 500 food additives and contaminants and set maximum residue
limits for nearly 2,500 pesticide/commodity combinations. Codex also has passed maximum residue limits
for 15 veterinary drugs.4
The United States participates in Codex standard-setting process through U.S. Codex|comprised of Federal
Government ocials representing several Federal agencies,5 including FDA, and assisted by representatives
of food industry and consumer nongovernmental organizations. FDA, by participating on most Codex
committees, oers scientic and regulatory expertise and conveys its views on issues concerning Codex's
standards.6
At its inception, Codex's standards were aimed at facilitating trade negotiations and serving as a minimum
oor of acceptable food quality and safety in less developed countries. With the enactment of recent free trade
agreements, however, the status of Codex international food safety standards has been elevated, as these
agreements call for member states to use Codex standards as key references in setting their own national food
safety regulations. Two such agreements are the WTO accords that emerged from multilateral negotiations
during the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Taris and Trade and became eective on January 1, 1995: the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement
3Charles Riemenschneider, A Meeting of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 5 FDLI Update 3 (1999).
462 Fed. Reg. 36243 (July 7, 1997), at 36244-45.
5In the U.S. the Federal agencies that manage and carry out U.S. Codex activities include United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Commerce (DOC). See 63 Fed. Reg. 7118, *7118.
6Riemenschneider, supra note 3.
3on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).7 While the Codex Alimentarius Commission formulates
international food safety standards as a model of food legislation to be considered by member governments in
passing their respective national regulations, it stops short of requiring member states to adopt these measures
or engage in regulatory harmonization. In other words, what Codex oers the international community is
a set of safety standards that can be used by member countries as a blue print in adopting their own food
safety regulations. Both the SPS and TBT Agreements take Codex's model legislation mandate a step
further by expressly encouraging harmonization through the incorporation of international standards into
member states' domestic regulatory frameworks.
The SPS Agreement governs, among other things, regulations intended to \1) protect human or animal
life or health within a territory from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins, or diseases-causing
organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstus, and 2) to protect human life or health within a territory from
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants, or products thereof."8 This agreement mandates that
WTO member countries consider international standards, guidelines, or recommendations, when enacting
their domestic SPS measures. A member country is not required to incorporate international standards, but
must provide a scientic justication to pass a more stringent regulation aecting trade.9
In order not to violate the SPS Agreement, a regulation at issue must be based on sound scientic evidence
and must be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, and plant life or health. Thus,
the SPS Agreement while recognizing member states' legitimate interests in passing measures in the area of
food safety regulation, guards against the use of such measures as protectionist devices.10
7John S. Eldred & Shirley A. Coeld, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs To Know: Realizing The Impact of Globalization
on National Food Regulation, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 31, *32 (1997).
862 Fed. Reg. 36244 (July 7, 1997).
9Id.
10Eldred & Coeld, supra note 4, at 33.
4It is important to note that the SPS Agreement designates the Codex as one of the key sources of recog-
nized international food standards. Even though the SPS Agreement does not obligate member states to
incorporate Codex standards into their domestic regulatory structures, it does mandate a scientic justica-
tion for the enactment of food safety regulations exceeding Codex requirements. While national regulatory
measures based on Codex standards are presumed to be in compliance with the SPS Agreement, member
states' regulations that exceed Codex minimum requirements can be challenged as unjustiable restrictions
on trade.11
In a case of a perceived violation of the SPS Agreement, a member country can bring a complaint before the
WTO dispute resolution body to decide whether health and safety measures exceeding Codex standards can
be scientically justied or should be deemed an illegal barrier to trade. In the event of the WTO adverse
ruling, a violating country must abide by the WTO decision or face trade sanctions.12 Thus, the WTO
dispute resolution structure puts some muscle behind Codex standards by designating them as a persuasive
authority in the resolution of trade disputes.13
Similarly to the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement promotes harmonization by encouraging the use by
member states of standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures that are based
on work done by international standard-setting bodies. The TBT Agreement's primary goal is to deter
national governments from using domestic technical regulations for protectionist purposes. Additionally, the
TBT Agreement aims at ensuring that technical regulations{such as nutritional labeling and compositional
food standards{are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulll member states' legitimate technical
objectives. Although, unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not explicitly call on member
states to refer to Codex standards in trade disputes, the WTO requires member states in eectuating the
11Bruce A. Silverglade, The Impact of International Trade Agreements on U.S. Food Safety and Labeling Standards, 53 Food
& Drug L.J. 537 (1998).
12Id. at 537.
13Eldred & Coeld, supra note 2.
5TBT Agreement's mandate to use all relevant international technical standards, which implicitly includes
the Codex standards.14
To investigate practical food safety implications of Codex's newly elevated status as the international refer-
ence organization for food safety, it is essential to consider a beef hormones dispute|the rst case where the
WTO dispute resolution body invoked Codex standards as a key reference authority in a trade disagreement
between the EU and the U.S. over hormones-treated beef.
II. The Beef Hormones Dispute
The beef hormones dispute illustrates the response of the WTO to protectionism in the guise of a food safety
measure based on local consumer preferences regarding acceptable food safety risks. The WTO ruling on
Beef Hormones dispute{formally known as European Communities (EC) Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products{was a landmark decision, oering the rst interpretation of the SPS Agreement's central
provisions and indicating how the WTO may handle similar disputes in the future.15
In this case, the United States and Canada challenged EC ban on imports of meat and meat products
from cattle treated with growth hormones. Treating cattle with hormones{a common practice in the United
States and Canada{is largely banned by the EC law. Relevant EC Directives prohibited the sale of domestic
and imported meat treated with certain natural and synthetic growth hormones, providing exceptions for
hormones administered by a veterinarian for certain therapeutic or zoo-technical purposes, and for certain
natural hormones permitted by the EC member states regulations.16
The Codex Alimentarius{which the SPS Agreement identies as the international standard-setting authority
for veterinary residues{recommends that ingestion of hormones in accordance with good animal husbandry
14Id. at 33.
15Warren H. Maruyama, A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound Science, 32 Int'l Law 651, *667 (1998).
16Id.
6practice is \unlikely to pose a hazard to human health." 17 Under the SPS Agreement, to adopt a more
stringent regulation|exceeding Codex's recommended level of protection|a country would have to provide
a scientically based justication. The WTO Panel found the EC Directives banning meet from hormones-
treated cattle did not comply with the SPS Agreement's Article 5 requirement that food safety measures be
based on a risk assessment, because there was not sucient evidence that the EC actually took into account
a risk assessment when it enacted its sanitary measure.18
On appeal, the WTO Appellate Body concluded that since the EC Directive measure was more stringent than
the relevant international standard it was subject to Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. Under Article 3.3, a
member state seeking a more stringent level of protection than an international standard has to comply with
the procedural requirements of Article 5.1. interpreting \risk assessment." The Appellate Body concluded
that Article 5.1, read in conjunction with Article 2.2, requires a risk assessment to be \based on scientic
principles" and \scientic evidence." Signicantly, the Appellate Body construed Article 5.1 to mandate an
objective relationship between the safety measure at issue and the risk assessment:
We believe that Article 5.1, when contextually read as it should be, in conjunction with and as
informed by Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, requires that the results of the risk assessment must
suciently warrant|that is to say, reasonably support|the SPS measure at stake.19
To put it dierently, what the Appellate Body held was that an SPS measure in question is not based on
\sucient scientic evidence" for purposes of Article 2.2 and 5.1, unless it bears a rational relationship to
the scientic risk assessment.
The Appellate Body agreed with the earlier panel's ruling that given the scientic evidence showing that
17EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products|Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA. Para.8.86 (Aug. 18, 1997)
at <http://www.wto.org.>
18Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.1781, *1783
(Oct. 15, 1997).
7hormones were not likely to imperil human health, the EC could not adopt a policy of \zero risk." Specically,
the Appellate Body found that the EC had violated Articles 5.1 and 5.2, because it failed to provide a risk
assessment reasonably supporting EC import ban:
In the absence of any other relevant documentation, we nd that the European Communities did
not actually proceed to an assessment, within the meaning of Articles 5.1 and 5.2, of the risks
arising from the failure of observance of good veterinary practice combined with problems of control
of the use of hormones for growth promotion purposes. The absence of such a risk assessment,
when considered in conjunction with the conclusion actually reached by most, if not all, of the
scientic studies relating to the other aspects of risk noted earlier, leads us to the conclusion that
no risk assessment that reasonably supports or warrants the import prohibition embodied in the EC
Directives was furnished to the Panel.20
Importantly, the Appellate Body held that a risk assessment should not be construed as strictly limited
to quantiable risk, thereby allowing some room for considering non-science factors that are not readily
amenable to strictly quantitative analysis. However, such construction could prove dangerous if it were in-
terpreted in the future WTO rulings as allowing risk assessment based on mere consumer preferences, public
passions, or scientically unjustied fears, such as mistrust of genetically modied foods. This potential dan-
ger of an overly-broad interpretation of the Appellate Body's allowance for consideration of non-quantiable
factors in risk analysis should be kept in check by the overarching rule|that there must be an objective
relationship between the scientic risk assessment and an SPS regulation.21
The beef hormones dispute illustrates how coordination with Codex has strengthened the WTO dispute
resolution structure by infusing it with crucial scientic expertise and linking WTO standards to a multi-
lateral scientic consensus. While in this dispute the EC's import ban on hormones treated beef was ruled
to violate the SPS Agreement, the decision did not foreclose the possibility of future valid food safety reg-
ulations reecting a regionally or nationally determined \appropriate level of protection."22 What does the
21Maruyama, supra note 14, at 672.
22Marsha A.Echols, Food Safety Regualation in the European Union and the United States: Dierent Cultures, Dierent
Laws, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 525, *542 (1998).
8status of Codex standards{as central reference authority in resolution of international trade disputes{mean
for national food regulations of member states in general and for the United States in particular? Are na-
tional governments likely to feel pressured to lower their national regulations that exceed Codex standards
to avoid the possibility of these measures being challenged as trade barriers? Codex standards' presumption
of validity in WTO trade disputes, raises a danger that U.S. food safety will be compromised as a result of
the regulatory establishment's eort to appease domestic food producers and food exporters that could be
harmed by potential trade disputes and retaliatory trade measures from abroad.23
The concern is that the U.S. domestic regulatory bodies in deference to the interests of U.S. agricultural
exporters{who do not want to be subjected to retaliatory trade measures from abroad{might allow imports
of food products that are currently banned due to their failure to meet FDA food safety regulations. Do-
mestic food producers may respond by lobbying regulatory agencies to lower food safety requirements to the
level allowed for imports, so as not to be discriminated against by such a dual regulatory system, thereby
lowering an overall level of consumer protection.24
Will the FDA{whose food safety requirements tend to exceed those set by Codex{feel compelled to lower its
regulatory bar to accommodate food producers' and food exporters' interests? How should FDA structure
its policy to successfully implement its public health mandate while at the same time accommodating U.S.
trade interests? To examine these issues, it is rst necessary to take a closer look at Codex's standard-setting
process and to compare its food safety requirements with those of the FDA.
III. Codex's Standard-Setting Process and Food Safety Requirements
Codex Alimentarius Commission 's mandate includes two competing objectives: ensuring fair international
23Bartlett Miller, The Eect of the GATT and the NAFTA on Pesticide Regulation: A Hard Look at Harmonization, 6
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 201, *216 (1990).
24Silverglade, supra note 4, at 3.
9trade in food and protecting the health of consumers. The duality of Codex's mandate sharply dierentiate
it form FDA, whose sole overarching mandate is to protect public health.25 Due to the inherent tension
between its two competing objectives, Codex is arguably ill suited to eectively safeguard consumer health.
Furthermore, unlike the FDA, Codex is not subject to strict procedural guidelines that ensure that public
health will be suciently protected. For instance, in contrast to the FDA, Codex is not subject to a codied
standard requiring it to apply precautionary principles or indicating precisely how Codex is to assess whether
consumer health is adequately safeguarded.26
Codex's voting rules are far from conducive to the adoption of health protective food standards. Codex
adopts health and safety standards by majority vote of its member states. Under Codex's voting rules,
each member country can vote on each standard under consideration. Signicantly, self-interested countries
are not barred from voting on the passage of standards that would promote their respective economic
interests at the expense of public health protection. For instance, France and other European countries
that produce and export non-pasteurized milk cheeses have blocked all Codex dairy standards that would
mandate pasteurization, whereas pottery-producing countries, such as Portugal and Spain have objected to
high lead standards.27
Given such voting rules, it is not surprising that at the standard-setting sessions the U.S.{whose food
safety standards are generally more protective of public health than those of other Codex members{is often
outvoted. If member states with weaker domestic food safety regulations were to vote for more protective
Codex standards, their products would be barred from international commerce. Given the accompanying
incentives to protect their respective economic interests, it is not surprising that Codex's member states are
likely to vote in a manner that would advance their trade interests, and ultimately set and maintain weak
25Lucinda Sikes, FDA's Consideration of Codex Alimentarius Standards in Light of International Trade Agreements, 53
Food & Drug L.J. 327, *328 (1998).
26Id.
27Id.
10food safety standards.28
This systemic tendency to produce food safety standards that are insuciently protective of public health is
further reinforced by the recent amendments in Codex's procedural rules. At the twenty-third session, held
in summer of 1999, the Commission amended its Rules of Procedure to emphasize that every eort should
be made to reach consensus when adopting or amending codex texts.29 The practical implication of this
procedural amendment is likely to be a further reinforcement of a downward pressure on international food
safety standards. While this procedural amendment is clearly aspirational, it nevertheless might add to the
members' desire to adopt standards by a wider majority margin, which, in turn, would make it more dicult
for member states to reach consensus on high standards.
The pressure to keep Codex standards low is further intensied by Codex's broad-based membership. Out
of the 165 member states the vast majority is comprised of the developing countries that lack economic
resources to develop and enforce rigorous domestic regulatory structures. While a broad-based membership
endows Codex with an air of democratic spirit, the sharp economic disparities in the abilities of developed
and developing countries to enact stringent domestic food safety regulations are likely to to contribute to
maintaining Codex standards weak.
The Codex standard-setting process has also been criticized for being insuciently open and participatory.
While non-governmental organizations are formally allowed to attend the Commission's meetings, their
eective participation is hamstrung by the fact that they are rarely provided ahead of meetings with relevant
background documents and by the fact that Codex' procedural rules preclude full dissemination of consumer
views to Commission's participants. The lack of openness in Codex's standard-setting procedures can be
further underscored by the Commission's adoption of certain standards in closed sessions. For instance, the
Codex decision on maximum residue limits for growth-promoting hormones in meat production was passed
28Id. at 329.
29Reimenschneider, supra note 1.
11by secret ballot at the Commission's July 1995 session, despite a great interest in this matter expressed by
consumer groups in many countries.30
While in recent years the attendance of Codex standard-setting meetings by consumer and environmental
groups has increased, nongovernmental representation of these organizations remains sporadic at best, and
the Commission has failed to reform its decision-making process to ensure adequate public participation.
In sharp contrast to the under-representation of the consumer and environmental organizations, industry
groups have long been closely involved in the Codex standard-setting process. For instance, at the June
1997 Codex meeting, industry interests were well represented by several food industry heavy weights, such
as Coca-Cola, Pepsi Cola, Monsanto, and Pzer, and by such trade associations as the International Dairy
Federation, the International Council of Grocery Manufacturers Associations, the International Soft Drink
Council, and the International Glutamate Technical Committee.31
A stark imbalance of power in the representation between industry and consumer groups was revealed by the
asymmetry of representation of nongovernmental organizations that attended the 1997 Codex meeting: of the
thirty-seven participating nongovernmental groups only three represented the public interest organizations.
This imbalance of power was also reected in the composition of member-states' delegations:
Whereas many of them included industry advisors, only three{from the United States, Germany, and
Norway{included consumer representatives.32
IV. Comparison of Codex's and the FDA's Standards & Suggested Policy Response
Codex's tendency to adopt and maintain standards insuciently protective of public health is rooted not
only in its awed standard-setting procedures, its compositional makeup, and its voting rules, but also in the
30Sikes, supra note 16, at 329.
31Id. at 330.
32Id.
12ambiguousness of Codex's sound science principles, which were designed to safeguard public health in adopt-
ing food safety standards. To better fulll its newly elevated status as the WTO designated international
reference organization for food safety, in 1995 the Codex Alimentarius Commission passed the following pru-
dential scientic principles in the Codex Statements of Principles Concerning the Role of Science in Codex
Decisions:
1) The food standards, guidelines and other recommendations of Codex Ali-
mentarius shall be based on the principle of sound scientic analysis and evidence, involving a
through review of all relevant information, in order that the standards ensure the quality and
safety of the food supply.
2) When elaborating and deciding upon food standards Codex Alimentarius will have regard, where appropriate, to other legitimate factors relevant for the health protection of consumers and for the promotion of fair practices in food trade.
3) In this regard it is noted that food labeling plays an important role in furthering both of these objectives.
4) When the situation arises that members of Codex agree on the necessary level of protection of public health but hold diering views about other considerations, members may abstain from acceptance of the relevant standard without necessarily preventing the decision by Codex.33
These principles demonstrate that in conducting its business and adopting international standards, Codex
is guided by fundamental philosophy rooted in sound science and risk assessment. However, the soundness
of these overarching science-based policy guidelines should not overshadow the still remaining gaping ambi-
guities and loopholes in the language of these principles. For instance, \other legitimate factors relevant for
the health protection of consumers" referred to in the Codex's second sound principle are left undened, as
are factors relevant for \the promotion of fair practices in food trade."34 Short of subsequent denition of
these terms by Codex itself, these ambiguities could only be claried by the future rulings of WTO dispute
resolution panels involving Codex's standards.
To avoid gridlock caused by dierent understanding of these terms by dierent member states in formulat-
34Michael Wehr, Update on Issues Before the Codex Alimentarius, 52 Food & Drug L.J. 531,*532 (1997).
13ing and adopting food safety standards, Codex would have to at least clarify{if not precisely dene{these
key terms. Moreover, the fourth guiding principle eectively allows a member state to opt out of a Codex
regulation that it nds inconsistent with its views on considerations other than the standard's public health
merits. While such \other than public health safety" considerations have not been precisely dened they
may include such factors as environmental issues, social factors, or cultural values.35
This conspicuous lack of precise denitions of the key terms in Codex's guiding principles may well be
a political compromise necessary for achieving consensus between a wide range of member countries with
dierent economic, cultural and regulatory conditions and capabilities. While this strategic ambiguity in
Codex's guiding principles clearly would undermine its eectiveness during considerations of controversial
standards, it may be a necessary price for enabling Codex to function eectively in setting standards in the
areas of common interests to most of its members.
The constraining impact of divergent economic and cultural interests of dierent member states on Codex's
adoption of uniformly high safety standards, aording adequate protection to consumers worldwide, have
been demonstrated by states' disagreements over mandatory labeling of genetically-modied foods. Codex
has had diculty in reaching a consensus on this issue due to divergent positions held by dierent countries.36
Many countries, and especially those of the EU, have been particularly vocal in demanding mandatory la-
beling of genetically engineered foods. Other states, led by the United States, have argued that genetically
modied foods should be subject to mandatory labeling only if they contain allergens, their composition is
altered substantially, or if they contain a new food additive.37
Signicantly, in advocating the mandatory labeling of genetically altered foods, many Codex members have
argued that such a safety standard was justied by the consumers right to know, thus falling within the
35Id.
36Report of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Labeling app. VI, Codex Doc. Alinorm 97/22 A, as
cited in Michael Wehr, supra note 19, at 533.
37Sara M. Dunn, From Flav'r Sav'r To Environmental Saver? Biotechnology And The Future Of Agriculture, International
Trade, And The Environment, 9 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 145,*153 (1998).
14meaning of the fair trade provisions of Codex's second sound science principle.38 Upon reviewing this issue,
Codex's Executive Committee stated that while it is essential in setting standards to adhere closely to the
four sound scientic principles to ensure product safety, the consumer's right to know was a loosely-dened
factor that needed to be dened on a case-by-case basis.39 Although Codex Commission has not achieved a
nal decision on the issue of labeling of genetically modied foods, the controversy highlights once again the
diculty of promulgating global science-based food safety standards in the areas of food safety regulation
that are hotly contested by dierent member states.40
The problematic nature of adopting international standards in the areas of member states' divergent regula-
tory interests has also been underscored by the debate between the EU and the U.S. on what constitutes an
acceptable level of risk in setting safety standards for several dairy products with the raw milk ingredient.
The U.S. argued for mandatory pasteurization, whereas the EU countries advocated meeting only general
principles of food hygiene coupled with Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points systems and end-product
testing as adequate venues for ensuring product safety.41 The diculty of adopting stringent Codex stan-
dards in the areas of member states' conicting interests has been vividly illustrated by the Commission's
passage of a number of food safety standards deemed to be inadequate by the United States. For instance,
over the U.S. strenuous objections, Codex approved the following measures: 1) inspection systems admin-
istered by company employees rather than by government regulators; 2) nutrient content claims prohibited
by FDA food labeling regulations; 3) mineral water standards permitting higher levels of contaminants and
lower levels of minerals than those allowed by FDA; 4) production of unpasteurized dairy products. Since
these standards have been passed by the Codex|and therefore carry a presumption of validity in interna-
38Wehr, supra note 33, at 533.
39Report of the Forty-Third Session of the Executive Committee of the Codex Alimentarius Commission Sec. 27-30, Codex
Doc. Alinorm 97/3, as cited in Michael Wehr, supra note 19, at 533.
40In position papers regarding Codex labeling standards, FDA argued that all standards should be based on sound scientic
principles and technical information. See Michel A. Wittaker, Reevaluating The Food And Drug Administrations Stand On
Labeling Genetically Engineered Foods, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 1215, *1231-1234 (1998).
41Wehr, supra note 33, at 533.
15tional trade disputes|the United States might be compelled to open its domestic market to imports of these
products or be faced with trade sanctions.42 Opening its domestic market to food imports deemed to be
unsafe by the U.S. regulators, can pose a danger of creating a dual regulatory structure with more rigid food
safety standard for domestically produced foods and less stringent requirements for imported food products.
As such a dual regulatory structure would place domestic producers at a disadvantage, the FDA might feel
compelled to lower domestic food safety regulations to the level permitted for imports, thereby endangering
consumer health.
As a result of the problems embedded in its standard-setting process|the inherently contradictory nature
of its mandate, its vast membership, awed voting procedures, and the ambiguity of its sound scientic
principles|Codex has adopted food safety standards that are largely less protective of consumer health
than those of the FDA.43 According to a 1997 report by the Center for Science in the Public Interest, there
are ve regulatory areas in which Codex standards fall below U.S. domestic standards: pasteurization of
dairy products, food additives, mineral content of bottled water, meat inspection, and lead contamination.44
In implementing its statutory mandate of protecting public health, the FDA should not adopt those Codex's
standards that do not meet statutory requirements outlined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA). In fact, in ratifying and implementing the WTO trade agreements, Congress expressly stipulated
that \nothing in this Act shall be construed...to amend or modify any law of the United States, includ-
ing any law relating to...the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health."45 Accordingly, FDA's
paramount goal in considering Codex standards should be eectuating its mission of safeguarding public
health. In reviewing Codex's standards for possible incorporation into the U.S. regulatory framework, FDA
42Silverglade, supra note 4, at 3.
43Sikes, supra note 16, at 331.
44Center For Science in the Public Interest, International Harmonization of Food Safety and Labeling Standards
10-28 (1997), as cited in Lucinda Sikes, supra note 16, at 331.
45Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, Sec. 102(a)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994) (codied at 19 U.S.C.
Sec. 3512), as cited in Lucinda Sikes, supra note 16, at 332.
16should exercise independent judgement and should not be swayed by international pressures to adopt any
given Codex standard that can compromise public health in the U.S.
In considering Codex's standard for possible adoption in the domestic regulatory framework, FDA should
focus only on those standards that provide equal or greater protection than those already in place in the
U.S., as well as those Codex's standards that address food safety issues previously unregulated by FDA.46
If adopted in the U.S., Codex's standards would have to be regularly reviewed to ensure that they provide
the acceptable level of consumer protection.
FDA expressed intention to focus its review of Codex standards primarily on post-1993, as these standards
have been designed to reect the new role of Codex as the WTO designated reference organization under the
SPS and TBT Agreements, whereas pre-1993 standards were primarily intended to assist developing nations
in product standardization. However, given the serious problems embedded in the Codex's standard-setting
process, it would be dangerous for the FDA to assume that post-1993 standards are sure candidates for
acceptance into the domestic regulatory infrastructure. Recognizing the shortcomings in Codex's standard-
setting process, U.S. Codex stated in 1995 that it is unlikely that regular acceptance of Codex standards
will be prudent until at least the year 2000:
Ideally, within the next ve to ten years...Codex standards would be established through a more
transparent and fully participatory process; based on stronger, more consistent scientic principles;
and fully protective of health in all countries.47
Importantly, in its review of Codex standards, the FDA should not only determine whether Codex standards
fall below domestically mandated health protection requirements, but also should armatively object to the
adoption of such weak standards by Codex and establish the record of the U.S. delegation's rational for
objecting to the proposed Codex standards. In this way, even if the U.S. ultimately does not prevail in
blocking the adoption of weak Codex standards, it will accumulate a record of scientically based reasons
46Sikes, supra note 16, at 332.
17why the contested Codex's standards fail to aord American consumers adequate protection. Such a record
can assist in deterring potential trade complaints by U.S. trading partners challenging the FDA's more
stringent food safety regulation and could provide a foundation for defense in the event that a dispute is
brought before the WTO.48
V. The Limits of Harmonization: Impact of Culture on Food Regulation
Whether it comes to mandatory pasteurization of dairy products, antibacterial treatment of bottled mineral
water, perceived health hazards of hormone-treated beef or genetically-engineered foods, disagreements be-
tween the EU and the U.S. over these issues raise important questions of what role do cultural variables play
in conicting food safety regulations and what limits do they place on the prospects of global regulatory
harmonization.
Cultural factors and attitudes inuence regulation both in the EU and the U.S. These cultural inuences are
especially paramount in the development of regulatory measures governing the production and marketing of
foods. Both the EU and the U.S. must guard the safety of food supplied to their citizens, while at the same
time accommodating substantial dierences in cultural attitudes and consumers' perceptions of what consti-
tutes a food safety risk. Given signicant dierences between the EU and the U.S. in cultural inuences and
consumers' understandings of what constitutes safe food, it is not surprising that these two powerful inter-
national commercial players have been involved in a number of disputes and are likely to wage trade battles
over food safety in the future.49 Despite the globalization of the food production, local inuences on food
and dietary preferences remain strong in Europe.50 Historically, Europeans have preferred traditional food
practices. European consumers and regulators alike believe that traditional practices and the foods they
48Sikes, supra note 16, at 333.
49Echols, supra note 14, at 542.
50Louis Lorvellec, Back To The Fields After The Storm: Agriculture In The European Union After The Uruguay Round
Agreements, 2 Drake J. Agric. L. 411, *426 (1997).
18produce are safe and{importantly for most European consumers|natural. As a result, European regulatory
structure permits the production of unpasteurized milk cheeses and traditional cured meats|foods that the
U.S. regulators along with most scientists deem unsafe.51
The ip side of Europeans' preference for natural foods has been their deep mistrust of new food produc-
tion technologies. European consumer groups have been much more vocal in their opposition to new food
production and processing technologies than their U.S. counterparts. For instance, in Europe, genetically
engineered corn and soybeans set o a wave of well-publicized opposition to this new technology and de-
mands for labeling, whereas the market share of genetically engineered crops in the U.S. continues to grow
without signicant opposition from consumer groups.52
In response to vociferous opposition by consumer groups, European regulatory bodies have called for manda-
tory labeling of genetically modied foods to inform consumers of the underlying process of food modica-
tion.53 The FDA, by contrast, does not require labeling of genetically modied foods if their composition
is not signicantly altered and if they do not contain allergens. Since U.S. regulatory agencies, based on
scientic data, have concluded that there is no substantial dierence between genetically modied and tradi-
tional foods, and therefore genetically altered foods do not require special labeling{unless there are narrowly
dened safety issues{the U.S. has opposed the EU's requirements of labeling of biotechnology foods as sci-
entically unwarranted.54
51Echols, supra note 14, at 542.
52Jerey Kluger, Atlantic Food Fight: The Battle Heats Up Between The U.S. and Europe Over Genetically Engineered
Crops, Time, September 13, 1999, at 42.
53European Union: France Issues Labeling Rules To Implement EU's Directive On Genetically Modied Food, BNA Inter-
national Environmental Daily, Feb.14, 1997, at D2 (In reaction to the European Commission's decision approving imports
of genetically modied corn seed, the French government mandated stringent labeling requirements for genetically modied
food.)
54Judith E. Beach, No \Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants, 53 Food & Drug
L. J. 181, *182 (1998). (Arguing that based on extensive regulatory review and testing, FDA, USDA, and EPA concluded that
genetically modied plants are as safe as plants bred with traditional agricultural methods, so that, unless specic safety issues
are raised, special labeling of genetically engineered foods is not required).
19The United States' cultural attitudes toward food has been reective of the Americans being more receptive
of technological innovation in general and its application to agriculture and food industry in particular.
Among U.S. consumers, trust in scientic method of risk assessment of any hazards associated with novel
method of food production and processing, by and large, has triumphed over a deep seated suspicion of any
method of food production that is not natural|i.e. not produced by traditional farming or agricultural
methods.55
The disparity between the EU and U.S attitudes toward new technologies and traditional methods of food
production largely stems from their vastly dierent agricultural traditions. In Europe, going back to the
Middle Ages, the link to the land and traditional form of agriculture is strong. Raw milk cheese and tradi-
tional cured meats are favored by European consumers and are permitted by regional and national regulatory
structures. Safety of these foods is assumed based on a centuries-long tradition of consumption rather than
on scientic laboratory evidence.56
In the U.S., by contrast, technological innovation has played a salient role in transforming American agricul-
ture. New technologies{and especially biotechnology{have enhanced U.S. agricultural sector's productivity
and competitiveness, while improving food safety and quality. As a result of this technologically driven
agricultural transformation|which brought consumers tangible and readily observable benets{U.S. public
largely embraced novel food production and processing methods, such as genetic engineering and irradia-
tion.57
55Echols, supra note 14, at 542.
56Id. at 528.
57Id. at 529.
20Since 1992, when the genetically modied Flav'r Sav'r Tomato was rst introduced in the U.S., American con-
sumers have seen the emergence of a robust market for genetically engineered agricultural products|which
includes corn, potatoes, soybeans, squash, carrots, papaya and other agricultural commodities.58 In contrast
to their European counterparts, American consumers often deem traditional methods of food production|
such as those employed in production of raw milk cheeses and cured meats|as unsafe. American consumers'
cultural attitudes are reected in the U.S. regulatory scheme, which relies on a scientic method of assessing
food safety and creates a regulatory structure conducive to the development of new food technologies, while
demonstrating a fair amount of skepticism about the safety of some traditional food production methods.59
While the inuence of culture on food safety regulations looms large in the EU and the U.S., it is restricted
by their respective national laws, as well as by their membership in the WTO. The SPS Agreement, in par-
ticular, limits the ability of national regulatory structures to enforce parochial cultural attitudes about food
safety by encouraging member states to rely on a standardized, global, science-based approach to regulation.
However, given the long history of dierent cultural attitudes to food{as has been illustrated by EU-U.S.
divide on a number of issues{how likely is it that a new global trade and regulatory infrastructure will over-
come these long-standing cultural dierences. Can international harmonization mitigate, if not eliminate,
these culturally rooted regulatory divides?
VI. Conclusion: Global Attempts at Strengthening Food Regulation
Partly as a response to the heightened focus on food safety regulations as potential barriers to trade{as
reected by controversies between the EU and the U.S. over the hormones-treated beef and genetically
engineered foods|the international community has responded with a proposal to undertake the formation
of an international food agency. For instance, director of the WHO has expressed an intention to create a
58Id.
59Id. at 530.
21global food agency as part of the UN.60 The attempts to strengthen food regulation on a global level can
also be seen in the eorts by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member
states to establish new, stronger national food regulation agencies in the OECD member states.61
These eorts are likely to be expedited by the rising tide of international commerce, raising concern of a
downward regulatory spiral. The danger is that without coordinated global regulatory cooperation, states{
in the pursuit of economic gains from trade{will engage in the regulatory race to the bottom. To ensure
that national food regulations aord consumers an adequate level of protection, many governments strive
to heighten their national regulatory structures, while coordinating these eorts with their counterparts
abroad. Given the cultural, political, and economic constraints on international regulatory harmonization,
the most promising strategy of strengthening food safety regulation globally would be to strengthen food
safety regulation by individual countries at the national level and use international institutions such as Codex
to coordinate these eorts at the international level.
Through its participation in Codex and other multilateral organizations, the U.S. should assume a leadership
role to ensure that international regulatory harmonization assumes an upward rather then downward tra-
jectory. With regard to the incorporation of Codex's standards into the U.S. domestic regulatory structure,
the FDA should adopt Codex standards only if they will improve food safety and only if they will provide
adequate protection to American consumers.
In light of its limited resources, the FDA should focus on considering incorporating Codex standards that
aord a higher level of protection than existing FDA standards or govern food safety issues not yet regulated
by the FDA. In implementing the review and the adoption of the Codex standards, FDA should adhere to
the democratic principles of openness and public participation, providing ample opportunities for the public
60Myron S. Weinberg, Global Corner, 5 FDLI Update 7 (1999).
61Id.
22to comment on the Codex standards being considered for adoption in the U.S.62
62Sikes, supra note 16, at 335.
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